November 9, 2021
Introduction
The previous report found that most Hungarian-language and Hungarian minority media outlets in Transcarpathia had strong political affiliations with the minority political parties and consequently they might be exploited as potential tools of political influence pushing illiberal, irredentist or simply conflict-oriented narratives.
For instance, the Transcarpathian Hungarian Cultural Association (KMKSZ), a strategic partner of Fidesz, cultivated a pool of media outlets (newspapers, news websites, TV channel) with financial support from the Hungarian government. Moreover, former Jobbik members, Hungarian nationals, who are more extreme Hungarian nationalists run a relatively popular Hungarian-language news website for the Transcarpathian Hungarian community.
Reading the political content in Hungarian minority media outlets in Transcarpathia suggested that conflict-oriented narratives were being pushed by local political actors (e.g., KMKSZ Hungarian Democratic Union of Ukraine, UMDSZ) through Facebook and the Hungarian minority media outlets. They seemed to be more prevalent than any other political narratives, including the Hungarian government narratives. These local narratives were as follows: 1) the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia is the victim of persecutions orchestrated by the Ukrainian government and Ukrainian media outlets; 2) Hungarians living in Transcarpathia should be recognized in Ukraine as indigenous people with a higher status in terms of rights and privileges than all other national minorities. There were also words and phrases characteristic of Russian narratives concerning Ukraine, e.g., “the February 2014 power takeover by nationalists,” so there may also be narratives of Russian origin in Hungarian minority media outlets.
Three research questions were defined with partners Slovak Security Policy Institute (Bratislava, Slovakia) and Expert Forum (Bucharest, Romania), mirroring analogous research in these countries: 1) How strong is Hungarian government propaganda among the Hungarian community in Transcarpathia (Ukraine) and what are the prevalent narratives? 2) How strong are the narratives of the Hungarians as mistreated minority and Hungarians as indigenous minority among the Hungarian community in Transcarpathia (Ukraine)? 3) How strong is the narrative of Ukraine as a failed state?
Methodology
The study was based on the content analysis of Facebook posts from pre-selected sources. All data was collected using CrowdTangle. To reduce the sample for content analysis, a predefined sets of keywords characteristic for certain narratives were applied. The resulting sample was divided into two parts based on the time scope. The first included posts published from May 1 through June 30, 2021, while the second included posts published from July 1 through August 31, 2021.
The resulting posts were manually reviewed and coded to confirm or reject the presence of the monitored narratives. The process of manually reviewing and coding the content reduced the potential for false positives and enabled more thorough content analysis than could be achieved based on automated keyword matching alone.
The list of narratives and associated sets of keywords was determined in consultation with Romanian and Slovak partners conducting analogous research in those countries. Some narratives were identified as shared by the Hungarian minority media outlets in all three countries.
These shared narratives (after some modifications to account for local circumstances) are as follows:
1. The territory of Ukraine should be changed (in favor of Hungary)
This narrative is essentially an irredentist one, calling for the detachment of the whole Transcarpathia from Ukraine and the return to pre-Trianon Hungarian borders. While one can come across such comments and posts in Facebook conversations, the presence of this narrative in the Hungarian minority media outlets in Ukraine was not anticipated.
Coded: ua_territory
2. Hungary is a protector of traditional values
This narrative is characteristic of the Hungarian government propaganda. It portrays the Orban government as protector of traditional, Christian values from left and liberal elites (George Soros, in particular), liberal EU (Brussels dictate), migrants, and Islam. The presence of this narrative in the Hungarian minority media outlets in Ukraine was anticipated.
Coded: hu_values
3. Hungarian identity in Ukraine is mistreated
This narrative is a local one. It portrays the Transcarpathian Hungarians as victims of persecutions and attempts at assimilation made by Ukrainian authorities. However, this narrative may be reproduced in the Hungarian mainstream pro-government media outlets, so there is a need to verify its presence and associated circumstances of its presence in the latter media outlets. The presence of this narrative in the Hungarian minority media outlets in Ukraine was anticipated.
Coded: ua_treatment
4. Hungarian state is taking care of the Hungarian communities abroad
This narrative is a local one. It portrays Hungarian government as taking care of the Hungarian communities in Transcarpathia instead of the Ukrainian and regional Transcarpathian authorities, and the Hungarian communities as highly reliant on the assistance from Hungary. The presence of this narrative in the Hungarian minority media outlets in Ukraine was anticipated.
Coded: hu_cares
5. Ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine should apply for Hungarian citizenship
This narrative is characteristic of the Hungarian government propaganda. It emphasizes the unity of the Hungarian nation, unified across borders thanks to the amendments to the Hungarian citizenship law adopted in 2011. The presence of this narrative in the Hungarian minority media outlets was not anticipated since most ethnic Hungarians in Transcarpathia acquired Hungarian citizenship years ago.
Coded: hu_citizenship
6. Hungary is a protector of the traditional family
This narrative is characteristic of the Hungarian government propaganda. It portrays the Hungarian government as protector of traditional family through the ban on the use of materials seen as promoting homosexuality and gender change in sex education for children. The presence of this narrative in the Hungarian minority media outlets was anticipated.
Coded: hu_lgbt
While the use of shared narratives makes the results of the studies conducted in Ukraine, Romania, and Slovakia comparable, the inclusion of Ukraine-specific narratives could make the results of this study more valuable.
The local Ukraine-specific narratives are as follows:
7. The Hungarian community in Transcarpathia should be recognized as indigenous minority
This narrative is based on the claim the ancestors of ethnic Hungarians has lived on the lands of modern Transcarpathia for a thousand years. Indigenous people as defined by the Ukrainian law have more rights and privileges than the rest of national minorities. The presence of this narrative in the Hungarian minority media outlets was anticipated.
Coded: ua_indigenous
8. Ukraine is a failed, dysfunctional state
This narrative is based on the claims usually made in the Russian media outlets that economic and political developments in Ukraine lead to the general decline, with no sign of improvement in sight. The presence of this narrative in the Hungarian minority media outlets was anticipated. It was included because Hungarian minority political leaders expressed similar views at least on some occasions in 2020-2021.
Coded: ua_failed
Monitored Facebook sources included: 1) pages run by both Hungarian minority media outlets and political actors (political parties, cultural associations, their local offices, and politicians); 2) pages run by five Hungarian mainstream pro-government media outlets.
First, the posts from the pages run by both Hungarian minority media outlets and political actors were queried by keywords associated with all eight narratives in Hungarian. Second, the posts from the pages run by five Hungarian mainstream pro-government media outlets were queried by keywords associated with narratives 3, 7, 8 (the narratives of mistreated Hungarian identity, indigenous minority, and Ukraine as a failed state) – to verify if they were reproduced in the Hungarian mainstream pro-government media outlets by the minority political leaders. Additionally, the posts from the Ukrainian-language Facebook pages run by the Hungarian minority media outlets were queried by the keywords associated with the narrative of Ukraine as a failed state.
For the purpose of answering research questions, the narrative 2, 5, and 6 (Hungary as a protector of traditional values, the need for the ethnic Hungarians to apply for Hungarian citizenship, Hungary as a protector of the traditional family) were assumed as characteristic of the Hungarian government propaganda.
Findings
The first part of the sample included 498 Facebook posts from 24 local Transcarpathian sources (both political actors and media outlets) and 426 Facebook posts from five Hungarian mainstream pro-government media outlets. These posts matched the pre-defined sets of keywords developed for eight narratives. Manual coding confirmed the presence of the studied narratives in 61 Facebook posts from local Transcarpathian sources and in 158 Facebook posts from the Hungarian mainstream pro-government media outlets.
To remove any doubts about the local or Hungarian origin of some narratives, the numbers of posts that represented the studied narratives in the minority media outlets were compared with the number of posts that represented these narratives in Hungarian mainstream pro-government media outlets. There were statistically significant differences (as confirmed first by chi-squared test and then by two sample z-test for comparing two proportions) in the proportions of posts that represented the narrative “Hungary as a protector of the traditional family” between one of the Hungarian mainstream pro-government media outlets (888.hu) and the minority media outlets; the proportion of such posts from 888.hu was greater that the proportions of such posts from the minority media outlets. There were also statistically significant differences in the proportions of posts that represented the narrative ”Hungary as a protector of traditional values” between some of the Hungarian mainstream pro-government media outlets (Magyar Nemzet, 888.hu, Hirado.hu, Magyar Hírlap) and one minority media outlet (KárpátHír); the proportions of such posts from Magyar Nemzet, 888.hu, Hirado.hu, Magyar Hírlap were greater than the proportion of such posts from KárpátHír (other minority media outlets did not publish such posts). In general, the narratives that were assumed as characteristic of the Hungarian government propaganda were more present in (at least some) Hungarian mainstream pro-government media outlets than in the minority media outlets.
Differences in the proportions of posts that represented local minority narratives (the Hungarians as the mistreated minority or the Hungarians as indigenous minority) between the minority media outlets and the Hungarian media outlets were not significant.
In case of political actors, all proportions of posts representing the studied narratives were greater than proportions of such posts from media outlets. Andrea Bocskor, Hungarian MEP born in Transcarpathia, was the only political actor that supported the two Hungarian government narratives (“Ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine should apply for Hungarian citizenship” and “Hungary is a protector of the traditional values”), but this was likely due to her Fidesz membership.
There were no statistically significant differences in the proportions of posts representing any studied narratives between minority media outlets. The proportions of posts for media outlets were compared in pairs within one narrative.
The posts from all minority sources representing the narrative of Hungarians as mistreated minority had the greatest sum of total interactions. The posts representing the local narrative of Hungarians as indigenous minority had the second largest sum of total interactions. Interestingly, the posts representing the Hungarian citizenship narrative, the narratives of Hungary as protector of traditional values and the traditional family had smaller sums of total interactions. This order was the same for the sums of total interactions for posts from the minority media outlets only. In general, the Hungarian government narratives appeared to be less important for the Hungarian community in Transcarpathia than the local minority narratives.
In fact, the narrative “Ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine should apply for Hungarian citizenship” was crowded out by a competing local narrative calling for the recognition of dual citizenship by Ukraine. The minority media outlets published several posts with the stories representing the narrative “Hungary is a protector of the traditional family”. However, these stories were simply republished articles taken from the Hungarian mainstream pro-government media outlets (e.g., Hirado.hu, ORIGO). KárpátHír also published three posts with the stories representing the narrative „Hungary is a protector of the traditional values”. Similarly, this media outlet republished MTI (Hungarian government-controlled news agency) stories on its website. Thus, the Hungarian mainstream pro-government media outlets tend to influence the minority media outlets by imposing the Hungarian government narratives.
Two local narratives – “Hungarian identity in Ukraine is mistreated” and “The Hungarian community in Transcarpathia should be recognized as indigenous minority” – seemed to be relatively more important for local political actors and media outlets. This is because: 1) the Ukrainian parliament was going to adopt a law on indigenous minorities in May-June 2021; 2) the Hungarian minority organizations and ethnic Hungarians in Berehovo received anonymous threats at the beginning of May 2021 (the perpetrators were detained on May 9).
There were no posts representing the narrative “The territory of Ukraine should be changed (in favor of Hungary)”. There were also no posts representing the narrative “Ukraine is a failed state” in the Ukrainian-language media outlets or Ukrainian versions of the Hungarian minority media outlets. However, there was one post representing this narrative in Kárpáti Igaz Szó, the Hungarian-language media outlet.
Comparing the average interactions for the posts representing the studied narratives and the average interactions for other posts (not representing the studied narratives) with an ANOVA test appeared to be the most appropriate way of measuring the receptiveness of audiences to these narratives. The ANOVA test revealed significant differences between the average interactions generated by the posts representing the narrative of Hungarians as mistreated minority and the average interactions generated by the other posts (in favor of the former posts) in Kárpátalja hetilap, KárpátHír, Kárpátinfo portál and the Hungarian-language version of Karpat.in.ua. There were also significant differences between the average interactions generated by the posts representing the narrative of Hungarians as indigenous minority and the average interactions generated by the other posts (in favor of the former posts) in KÁRPÁTALJA.ma and the Hungarian-language version of Karpat.in.ua. Interestingly, there were also significant differences between the average interactions generated by the posts representing the narrative of Hungary as a protector of the traditional family and the average interactions generated by the other posts (in favor of the former posts) in KárpátHír and the Hungarian-language version of Karpat.in.ua. In general, the local narratives resonated deeply with the Facebook audiences of five out of the seven minority media outlets that had posts representing them. The posts representing the narrative of Hungary as a protector of the traditional family resonated with the Facebook audiences of two out of the three minority media outlets that had posts representing them.
The averages interactions for the posts representing the two Fidesz propaganda narratives (Hungary as a protector of traditional values and the traditional family) in Hungarian mainstream pro-government media outlets were also compared with the average interactions generated by the other posts from these media outlets. The ANOVA test revealed significant differences between the average interactions generated by the posts representing both narratives and the average interactions generated by the other posts (in favor of the former posts) in ORIGO. The same test revealed significant difference between the average interactions generated by the posts representing the narrative of Hungary as a protector of traditional values and the average interactions generated by the other posts (in favor of the former posts) in 888.hu. There was also significant difference between the average interactions generated by the posts representing the narrative of Hungary as a protector of the traditional family and the average interactions generated by the other posts (in favor of the former posts) in Magyar Hírlap. In general, the Facebook audiences of ORIGO, 888.hu, Magyar Hírlap seemed to be receptive to the selected Fidesz propaganda narratives (or at least some of them), while the Facebook audiences of Hirado.hu and Magyar Nemzet did not seem to be particularly interested in them.
Kárpáti Igaz Szó did not support the Hungarian government narratives at all. It was expected since UMDSZ holds 50% stake in the media outlet. UMDSZ was the partner of the Fidesz rival – MSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party) – in the past. Unexpectedly, there were posts representing the Hungarian government narratives in KárpátHír, run by the Hungarian nationalists, and Kárpátinfo portál (independent). There was only one media outlet from the KMKSZ media pool – the Hungarian-language version of Karpat.in.ua – that supported any Hungarian government narratives at all. On the contrary, local narratives united media outlets of different political affiliations.
Summary
The findings of the analysis done on the Facebook posts created in May and June 2021 did not indicate that the Hungarian government propaganda was strong among the Hungarian community in Ukraine, at least in the minority media outlets and among the local political actors. The local minority narratives, problematic and divisive from Ukrainian perspective, e.g. those concerning Hungarians as indigenous people and mistreated minority, judging by the sums of total interactions they generated, were stronger in the Hungarian minority media outlets than the Hungarian government narratives.
The numbers of posts containing the studied narratives from the minority media outlets were very tiny in comparison with the total number of posts. The small proportions of such posts and absence of any statistical differences between the proportions were the reason to conclude that these media outlets were not politics oriented. While most of them had strong political affiliations, there were no statistically confirmed biases in favor of any studied narrative judging by the numbers of posts.
In case of the minority political actors, all proportions of posts representing the studied narratives were significantly greater than proportions of such posts from the minority media outlets. Unsurprisingly, the Fidesz propaganda narratives were more present in (at least some) Hungarian mainstream pro-government media outlets than in the minority media outlets. The studied narratives were found in posts from seven out of the ten minority media outlets, i.e. in all seven Hungarian-language media outlets (the other three sources publish content in Ukrainian).
In general, the presence of the posts representing the Hungarian government narratives contradicted the expectations. They were found in posts from three out of the ten media outlets only. Media outlets of the KMKSZ media pool were expected to support them because of the close relationship between KMKSZ and Fidesz. However, they were found in posts from one media outlet of the KMKSZ media pool (one out of the six sources of the KMKSZ media pool). Conversely, local minority narratives were found in posts from seven out of the ten minority media outlets, i.e. the media outlets of different political affiliations.
The receptiveness of Facebook audiences to the studied narratives was determined by comparing the average interactions for the posts representing such narratives and the average interactions of the other posts. The Facebook audiences of five out of the ten minority media outlets turned out to be receptive to local conflict-oriented narratives that were alienating the Hungarian minority from the Ukrainian society and state. Surprisingly, the Facebook audiences of two out of the ten minority media outlets turned out to be receptive to the narrative of Hungary as a protector of the traditional family.
The same comparisons for the Hungarian mainstream pro-government media outlets revealed that the Facebook audiences of ORIGO, 888.hu, and Magyar Hírlap were receptive to the selected Fidesz propaganda narratives (or at least some of them), while the Facebook audiences of Hirado.hu and Magyar Nemzet did not seem to be interested in them.
The next report will discuss the results of the content analysis done on the Facebook posts from July and August 2021.
Dmytro Borysov
This report has been prepared with support from IRI's Beacon Project. The opinions expressed are solely those of the author and do not reflect those of IRI.