State Responses to FIMI and Recomendations For Resilience

Dec 2024

Executive Summary:

Since 2015, the European Union and its members have sought to counter hostile influence by building societal resilience to foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI). While there have been successes in creating new institutional structures and policies, like the establishment of the European External Action Service’s Strategic Communication Task Forces and the Digital Services Act, these efforts have largely remained reactive and too narrowly focused. Responses have often been limited to the actions of a specific actor rather than the overall vulnerabilities and have overwhelmingly relied on fact-checking and media literacy, which only address a minority of threats present in the media space.

While their tactics for foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) vary, the Kremlin and Chinese Communist Party, as well as other authoritarian actors, have the capabilities and opportunities to exploit new vulnerabilities developing across Europe for years to come. Such potential for widespread damage, therefore, requires sustained international cooperation between multiple institutions at the European, NATO, and national level, increased coordination amongst policymakers, and engagement with diverse civil society organizations to effectively build a comprehensive whole-of-society resilience to foreign authoritarian influence.

To inform future responses, the International Republican Institute has commissioned case studies to review the responses to FIMI threats from Albania, Czechia, Estonia, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Taiwan, and Ukraine. These countries were selected to provide a mix of historical, cultural, and geographic perspectives on how to counter FIMI. The selected cases include those that are often perceived to be at the forefront of national responses to FIMI (Estonia, Taiwan, and Ukraine); those generally perceived to have good responses with improvements needed (Czechia, Poland, and Romania); those with limited responses or have been accused of backsliding in their response capabilities (Albania, North Macedonia, and Slovakia).

The case studies highlight that FIMI activities by foreign authoritarian actors, primarily the Kremlin and Chinese Communist Party, target all aspects of our democratic societies to try and inflame social and political debate, undermine trust in democratic institutions, and weaken international bodies like the EU and NATO. These different aspects of society can be better understood by the Comprehensive Resilience Ecosystem developed by the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats and the EU’s Joint Research Centre, which divides them into thirteen domains: Political, Public Administration, Legal, Intelligence, Diplomacy, Military Defence, Infrastructure, Economy, Space, Cyber, Information, Social, and Culture.[1] As these cover the breadth of responsible institutions at both the national and European level, one of the biggest issues across all case studies is fragmented institutional coordination. While some, like Estonia, Slovakia, and Ukraine, have sought to address these issues there remains significant work to be done. Other common trends across the case studies include insufficient legal frameworks, low levels of public awareness, and limited institutional capacity, which significantly reduce the societal resilience to FIMI.

A notable pattern across the case studies is the critical role of both domestic and international collaboration in countering these threats. Governments are urged to strengthen laws, enhance institutional frameworks, and foster cross-sector partnerships. The EU and NATO's role in harmonizing strategies and supporting member and candidate states is pivotal. Additionally, advancing media literacy and public awareness is emphasized as essential for long-term resilience against FIMI.

Key Recommendations for Policymakers:

Legislative Strengthening:
- Enact comprehensive laws defining and addressing FIMI with clear penalties.
- Harmonize national laws with EU regulations like the Digital Services Act.
Institutional Coordination:
- Establish dedicated national bodies or committees to oversee FIMI responses.
- Improve inter-agency communication and mandate regular updates on FIMI activities.
Strategic Communication:
- Develop unified whole-of-government and whole-of-society policies for strategic communication.
Media Regulation and Literacy:
- Increase transparency in media ownership and funding.
- Further integrate media literacy into education systems.
Technological Enhancements:
- Improve monitoring of social networks, emphasizing AI-driven content risks and the impact of algorithms.
Cross-Sector Collaboration:
- Create a forum for meaningful engagement with civil society, academia, and private sectors in crafting policies and implementing strategies to counter FIMI.
- Increase support for quality independent journalism.
International Cooperation:
- Deepen partnerships and increase standardization with NATO, EU, and regional allies to address hybrid threats, including FIMI.
Public Trust and Governance:
- Improve transparent governance to counteract the erosion of public trust.
Addressing AI and Emerging Threats:
- Develop common regulations for responsible AI use.
- Improve monitoring of emerging platforms like Telegram and TikTok to mitigate the risk of exploitation by authoritarian actors.
Monitoring and Accountability:
- Establish cross-sectoral oversight bodies for evaluating the effectiveness of FIMI strategies.
- Encourage whistleblower protections to uncover and prevent manipulation activities.

These recommendations aim to foster a proactive and cohesive approach to countering FIMI, ensuring democratic integrity and societal stability in the face of evolving hybrid threats.

[1] Hybrid Threats: A Comprehensive Resilience Ecosystem; European Union and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, 2023

Published Reports:

Estonia